This work describes two randomized, asynchronous, round based, Binary Byzantine faulty tolerant consensus algorithms based on the algorithms of [25] and [26] . Like the algorithms of [25] and [26] they do not use signatures, use O(n 2 ) messages per round (where each message is composed of a round number and a constant number of bits), tolerate up to one third failures, and have expected termination in constant number of rounds.
Introduction and related work.
Binary byzantine consensus concerns the problem of getting a set of distinct processes distributed across a network to agree on a single binary value 0 or 1 where processes can fail in arbitrary ways. It is well known that this problem is impossible in an asynchronous network with at least one faulty process [17] . To get around this, algorithms can employ randomization [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 19, 20, 25, 26, 30, 32, 34] , or rely on an additional synchrony assumption [13, 14] . Randomized algorithms largely rely on the existence of a local or common random coin. The output of local coin is only visible to an individual process, while the output of a common coin is visible to all processes, but only once a threshold of processes have participated in computing the coin. A strong common coin is one that outputs the same value at all processes while a weak one may output different values at different processes with a fixed probability [32] .
This work presents two algorithms that do not use signatures, use O(n 2 ) messages per round (where each message is composed of a round number and a constant number of bits), tolerate up to one third failures (a well know lower bound [21] ), and have expected termination in a constant number of rounds. from executing several threads with an appropriate multiplexing. Both notations i ∈ Y and p i ∈ Y are used to say that p i belongs to the set Y .
Communication network. The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous reliable point-to-point network. "Asynchronous" means that there is no bound on message transfer delays, but these delays are finite. "Reliable" means that the network does not lose, duplicate, modify, or create messages. "Point-to-point" means that any pair of processes is connected by a bidirectional channel. A process p i sends a message to a process p j by invoking the primitive "send tag(m) to p j ", where tag is the type of the message and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process p i receives a message by executing the primitive "receive()". The macro-operation broadcast tag(m) is used as a shortcut for "for each p i ∈ Π do send tag(m) to p j end for". Failure model. Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior [31] . A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to "pollute" the computation (e.g., by sending messages with the same content, while they should send messages with distinct content if they were non-faulty). A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called faulty. Otherwise, it is non-faulty. Moreover, it is assumed that the Byzantine processes do not fully control the network in that they can not corrupt the messages sent by non-faulty processes. Byzantine processes can control the network by modifying the order in which messages are received, but they cannot postpone forever message receptions.
A Common Coin. The model is enriched with the same common coin (CC) as in [26] that was originally defined in [32] . The common coin outputs a binary value at each non-faulty process for each round. All non-faulty processes output 0 in round r with probability 1/d and output 1 in round r with probability 1/d. Non-faulty processes output different values in round r with probability (d − 2)/d, where d ≥ 2 is a known constant. The output of the coin is revealed by calling a function random() provided by a random oracle. The output of the coin is unpredictable and random and its output is only revealed for a round r once at least one non-faulty process has called random() in that round (i.e. faulty processes cannot compute the output of the coin entirely themselves).
A Strong (t + 1) Common Coin. A strong common coin (SCC) is defined as a common coin that has d = 2 meaning that in every round all non-faulty processes receive the same output from the common coin. Furthermore t + 1 means the output of the coin for round r is not revealed until at least t + 1 non-faulty processes have called called random() in that round.
Notations.
• The acronym BAMP n,t [∅] is used to denote the basic Byzantine Asynchronous Message-Passing computation model; ∅ means that there is no additional assumption.
• The basic computation model strengthened with the additional constraint t < n/3 is denoted BAMP n,t [t < n/3].
• BAMP n,t [t < n/3] enriched with the common coin is denoted BAMP n,t [t < n/3, CC].
• BAMP n,t [t < n/3] enriched with the strong (t + 1) common coin is denoted BAMP n,t [t < n/3, SCC].
Before presenting the algorithms, the BV-Broadcast and SBV-Broadcast abstractions from [26] are recalled. Note that within the consensus algorithms multiple instances of these abstractions may be used, so to differentiate between these instances they are called with unique tags (denoted as tag in the presentation of the abstractions).
2.1
The BV-Broadcast abstraction from [26] Figure 1 : An algorithm implementing BV-broadcast in BAMP n,t [t < n/3] from [26] . For each instance of BV-Broadcast, each non-faulty process p i calls the abstraction with a unique tag tag for that instance and a binary value as input. It returns a set of binary values bin values, which has not necessarily achieved its final state when returned (i.e. the implementation of the abstraction may add items later). The abstraction ensures the following properties:
• BV-Termination. The invocation of BV broadcast() by a non-faulty process terminates.
• BV-Justification. If p i is non-faulty and v ∈ bin values i , then v has been BV-Broadcast by a non-faulty process.
• BV-Uniformity. If a value v is added to the set bin values i of a non-faulty process p i , eventually v ∈ bin values j at every non-faulty process p j .
• BV-Obligation. Eventually the set bin values i of a non-faulty process is non empty.
• BV-Single-value. If all non-faulty processes BV-Broadcast the same value v, v is eventually added to the set bin values i of each non-faulty process p i .
Note that the values input by non-faulty processes for a specific instance need not be from the set {0, 1}, they can be any values as long as the size of the set of values input by non-faulty processes is between 1 and 2. An algorithm implementing the BV-Broadcast abstraction is presented in Figure 1 . The reader is referred to [26] for proofs and a description of the code.
2.2
The SBV-Broadcast abstraction from [26] in BAMP n,t [t < n/3] For each instance of SBV-Broadcast, each non-faulty process p i calls the abstraction with a unique tag tag for that instance and a binary value as input. It returns two sets of binary values, the first being view and the second being bin values. While the set view has achieved its final state when returned, bin values may not have (i.e. the implementation of the abstraction may add items later). The abstraction ensures the following properties: (Note that the original SBV-Broadcast operation SBV broadcast tag(vi) is (01) bin valuesi ← BV broadcast tag(vi); (02) wait until(bin valuesi = ∅) // bin values i has not necessarily obtained its final value when the wait terminates (03) broadcast aux(w) where w ∈ bin valuesi (04) wait until(∃ a set view i such that its values (i) belong to bin valuesi and (ii) come from messages aux() received from (n − t) distinct processes); (05) return(view i, bin valuesi) Figure 2 : An algorithm implementing SBV-Broadcast in BAMP n,t [t < n/3] from [26] .
from [26] only returned a single set view, but the algorithms presented in this work will need an additional property ensured by bin values. Also note that this set already exists in the original implementation, here it is simply returned.)
• SBV-Termination. The invocation of SBV broadcast tag() by a non-faulty process terminates.
• SBV-Obligation. The set view i returned by a non-faulty process p i is not empty.
• SBV-Justification. If p i is non-faulty and v ∈ view i then a non-faulty process called SBV broadcast v.
• SBV-Inclusion. If p i and p j are non-faulty processes and view i = {v} then v ∈ view j .
• SBV-Uniformity. If all non-faulty processes SBV broadcast the same value v, then view i = {v} at every non-faulty process p i .
• SBV-Singleton. If p i and p j are non-faulty,
In this work the following additional property is introduced that was not originally included in [26] :
• SBV-Binvalues. The set bin values i returned by a non-faulty process p i satisfies the BV-Broadcast abstraction where non-faulty processes input the same values to this abstraction as they did to the SBV-Broadcast abstraction. Furthermore the set bin values i at a non-faulty process p i eventually contains every value returned in view j at every non-faulty process p j .
An algorithm implementing the SBV-Broadcast abstraction is presented in Figure 2 . The reader is referred to [26] for full proofs and a description of the code. Here the SBV-Binvalues is proved as it is added in this work. Proof. All properties other than SBV-Binvalues are proved in [26] . Proof of the SBV-Binvalues property: By line 04 the set view i returned on line 04 is the set bin values i returned by the call to BV broadcast which satisfies the BV-Broadcast abstraction. By BV-Uniformity all processes will eventually have the same set of values in their set bin values i which is the set returned by SBV-Broadcast, the proof then follows.
3 Binary Byzantine Consensus.
The Binary Consensus Problem.
In the binary consensus problem processes input a value to the algorithm, called their proposal, run an algorithm consisting of several rounds, and eventually output a binary value called their decision. Let V be the set of values that can be proposed. While V can contain any number (≥ 2) of values in multi-valued consensus, it contains only two values in binary consensus, e.g., V = {0, 1}. Assuming that each non-faulty process proposes a value, the binary Byzantine consensus (BBC) problem is for each of them to decide on a value in such a way that the following properties are satisfied:
• BBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
• BBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• BBC-Validity. If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be decided.
A Safe and Live Binary Byzantine Consensus
This section presents a Binary Byzantine Consensus algorithm using SBV-Broadcast in addition to a weak common coin.
Message types. The following message types are used by the consensus (in addition to those used by SBV-Broadcast).
• auxset[r](s). An auxset message contains a round number r and a set of binary values s.
Local variables. The following local variables are used at each process.
• r i . The current round at process i.
A map of sets of binary values at process i indexed by a round and an integer 0 − 2.
• bin values i []. A map of sets of binary values at process i indexed by a round.
• est i . The current binary estimate at process i. Figure 3 presents the algorithm. Non-faulty process call propose() with an initial binary proposal. Line 01 initializes the processes' estimate to its proposal and the round to 0. Non-faulty processes then repeat lines 02-15 for each round. First the round number is incremented on line 02. Non-faulty processes then call S broadcast with tag stage[r i , 0] and input est i . By SBV-Singleton this call will output view i [r i , 0] with a single unique value v or both binary values at all non-faulty processes.
Algorithm Description.
The idea behind this SBV-Broadcast is that (i) if view i [r i , 0] = {v} at least 1 non-faulty process then the remaining code if the round will ensure only v may be decided and additionally, if the output of the coin is also v at all all non-faulty processes, then they will set their estimate to v and decide by the following round.
Otherwise, (ii) if view i [r i , 0] = {0, 1} at non-faulty processes before the value of the coin is revealed then lines 04-05 are important to help non-faulty processes reach a decision. On line 04, non-faulty processes broadcast auxset[r i ](view i [r i , 0]) and on line 05 wait for (n − t) of these messages from distinct processes where the values are contained in bin values i . The set view i [r i , 1] is then computed as the set of these values. If view i [r i , 1] contains a single value then a process sets its estimate to this value otherwise it sets its estimate to ⊥. If (t + 1) non-faulty processes have view [i, 0] = {0, 1}, and broadcast auxset[r]({0, 1}), then given t < n/3, any set of (n − t) auxset[r]() messages will contain at least one of these messages meaning all non-faulty process will set their estimate to ⊥. The remaining code of the round will then ensure all processes set their estimate to the output of the coin and decide in the following round if the coin outputs the same value at all non-faulty processes.
Non-faulty processes then make a second call to SBV broadcast with tag stage[r, 1] and their current estimate as input. This returns the set view[r, 2] (line 10). A call to random() is then made on line 11. The purpose of this call to SBV broadcast is to ensure that through SBV-Uniformity if a non-faulty process decides then all non-faulty processes set their estimates to the same value and decide in the following round. For this, if view [r, 2] is a single value then this value is decided and is set as the processes' estimate (line 12), otherwise if view contains both a binary value and ⊥ then the binary value is set to the processes' estimate (line 13), otherwise view [r, 2] = {⊥} and the process sets its output to the value of the coin (line 14). Non-faulty processes then continue on to the next round.
Proofs.
This section shows that the algorithm of Figure 3 solves Binary Byzantine consensus and terminates in an expected constant number of rounds. Lemma 2. At the start of every round each non-faulty process has a binary estimate proposed by a non-faulty process.
Proof. The initial estimate at non-faulty processes is set to its binary proposal v on line 01. The estimate is then input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] on line 03. SBV-Justification and SBV-Binvalues then ensure both view [r, 0] and view [r, 1] only contain binary values proposed by non-faulty processes. The estimate is then set to either a binary value from view [r, 1] or ⊥ if both 0 and 1 are contained in view [r, 1] on lines 07-08. The estimate is then input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on line 10. By SBV-Justification view[r, 2] can only contain binary values or ⊥ where ⊥ means both 1 and 0 were proposed by non-faulty processes. On lines 12-14 the estimate is then set to either the binary value in view [r, 2], or the value of random() if ⊥ ∈ view [r, 2], where in either case the value must have been proposed by a non-faulty process. From this the next round is then started with a binary estimate proposed by a non-faulty process and the proof is the same for all following rounds.
Lemma 3. Only ⊥ or binary values can be input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on line 10 by nonfaulty processes. The binary values input have been proposed by non-faulty processes or if ⊥ is input then both 0 and 1 have been proposed by non-faulty processes.
Proof. By Lemma 2 all non-faulty processes start each round with a binary estimate proposed by a non-faulty process which is input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] on line 03. Now by SBV-Binvalues, bin values will only contain binary values at non-faulty processes. Thus view[r, 1] will only contain binary values (line 05) proposed by non-faulty processes and lines 06-08 will ensure only ⊥ (if both 0 and 1 have been proposed by a non-faulty process) or a binary value is input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on line 10 by non-faulty processes. Proof. By Lemma 2 all non-faulty processes start each round with a binary estimate which is input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] on line 03. By SBV-Termination all processes will complete the call to SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] line 03 and broadcast auxset[r](view [r, 0]) on line 04. By Lemma 2 and SBV-Binvalues the set view[r, 0] will contain binary values from bin values. Given this, all non-faulty processes will then receive (n − t) auxset[r](s) messages from distinct processes where s ∈ bin values and complete line 05. Non-faulty processes will then call and complete SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on line 10 by SBV-Termination. All non-faulty processes will then call random() on line 11 which will return a binary value.
From Lemma 6 which ensure no two distinct binary values will be input to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on line 10 and from SBV-Justification view [r i , 2] will contain either a single binary value or a single binary value and ⊥, which will then match a valid case on lines 12-15. Processes will then continue to the next round where the same proof construction applies. Proof. By definition, the value output by the coin will not be revealed in a round r until at least 1 non-faulty processes has called random(), i.e. a non-faulty process has reached line 11.For a non-faulty process to reach this line it must have received n − t messages from distinct processes on line 05 meaning at least t + 1 non-faulty processes have reached line 04 in round r before the coin is revealed. Consider the following two possible cases at the point where the t + 1th non-faulty process reaches this line, and before the value of the coin for round r is revealed (note that by Lemma 7 all non-faulty processes will eventually reach this line).
• First assume that at least one of the t + 1 non-faulty processes had view [r, 0] returned from SBV broadcast stage[r, 0] (line 03) containing a single binary value w. Now by Lemma 5 all non-faulty processes will input either ⊥ or w into SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] (line 10).
Then by SBV-justification all non-faulty processes will have either {w} or {w, ⊥} or {⊥} as view [r, 2] . Now if the output of the coin is w at all non-faulty processes then by lines 12-14 they all will set their estimates to w. Thus with probability of at least 1/d all non-faulty processes will set their estimate to the same binary value and by Lemma 8 will decide by the following round. Thus with probability of at least 1/d all non-faulty processes will set their estimate to the same binary value and by Lemma 8 will decide by the following round.
In both cases in round r non-faulty processes reach a state where they will reach a decision with probability of at least 1/d, or decision is ensured with probability 1 − ∞ r=1 1/d = 1. From this, the expected number of rounds to reach a state from which a decision is ensured is ∞ Proof. First recall the definition of Binary Byzantine Consensus.
BBC-Termination is ensured by Lemma 10. BBC-Agreement and BBC-Validity are ensured by Lemmas 9 and 4 respectively.
Message broadcasts. As defined in [26] , the implementation of the SBV-Broadcast abstraction consists of 2 to 3 message broadcasts. The algorithm of Figure 3 consists of a single message broadcast and two instances of SBV-Broadcasts, or 5 to 7 message broadcasts. Section 3.5 describes a way to reduce this to 4 to 5 broadcasts.
The S-Broadcast abstraction in BAMP n,t [t < n/3]
The following sections present a Binary Byzantine consensus algorithm based on the Algorithm of [26] that uses a strong (t + 1) common coin for correctness and termination. Each round of the algorithm of [26] consists of a call to BV-Broadcast followed by a normal message broadcast. Unfortunately here, in order to remove the fair scheduler requirement of [26] without increasing the number of message broadcasts the BV-Broadcast abstraction can no longer be used. Instead an S-Broadcast abstraction is introduced that can be thought of as breaking the BV-Broadcast abstraction into two separate instances of S-Broadcast, one for each binary value. Note that it follows a classical approach of broadcast/echo used in many similar abstractions.
The S-Broadcast abstraction takes as input a value v, and a Boolean value should broadcast . It returns a pointer to a Boolean variable s value. It is expected that if a non-faulty process calls S-Broadcast for a value v then all non-faulty processes call S-Broadcast for value v. The S-Broadcast abstraction ensures the following properties.
• S-Termination. The invocation of S broadcast() by a non-faulty process terminates.
• S-Justification. If s value i returned by a call to S-Broadcast with value v at a non-faulty process p i has s value i = true, then a non-faulty process has called S broadcast(v, true)
• S-Uniformity. If s value i returned by a call to S-Broadcast with value v at a non-faulty process p i has s value i = true, then eventually s value j = true at every non-faulty process p j .
• S-Obligation. If at least t + 1 non-faulty processes have called S broadcast(v, true), then eventually s value i = true at every non-faulty process p i .
An implementation of S-Broadcast is described in Figure 4 . Here non-faulty processes call S-Broadcast with an input v and a Boolean should broadcast . On line 01 non-faulty processes initiate the s value variable to false. If should broadcast is true, then non-faulty processes broadcast a message tag, s val(v). A pointer to s value is then returned, note that s value may become true at a later point in time.
Lines 04-09 describe what happens when a message tag, s val(v) is received with a value v equal to the input given during the invocation of S-Broadcast. If message tag, s val(v) has been received from (t + 1) distinct processes then the process broadcasts the same message if it has not already done so (lines 04-05) (i.e. it echos the message). Next, if messages tag, s val(v) has been received from (2t + 1) distinct processes then the process sets s value to true (lines 07-08).
Lemma 11. Figure 4 satisfies the SBC-Broadcast abstraction.
Proof. Proof of S-Termination: Figure 4 has no blocking operations. Proof of S-Justification: If no non-faulty process calls SBC-Broadcast with should broadcast = true then no non-faulty process broadcasts tags val(v) on line 02. Given t, no non-faulty process receives (t + 1) tags val(v) message from distinct processes and no non-faulty process broadcasts tags val(v) on line 05. From this and given 2t + 1 > t + 1 no non-faulty process sets s value to true on line 08. Proof of S-Uniformity: If a non-faulty process sets s value to true on line 08 then it has received (2t + 1) tags val(v) messages from distinct processes. From this and given t < n/3 all non-faulty processes will receive at least (t+1) tags val(v) messages from distinct processes and broadcast tags val(v) if not already done (line 05). From this all non-faulty processes will receive at least (2t+1) messages from distinct processes and set s value ← true (line 08). Proof of S-Obligation: If at least (t + 1) non-faulty processes call S-Broadcast with should broadcast = true then these processes broadcast tags val(v) on line 02 (if not already done) and all non-faulty processes receive at least (t + 1) messages from distinct processes. The proof follows using the same arguments as S-Uniformity.
A Safe and Live Consensus Algorithm in BAMP n,t [t < n/3, SCC].
This section presents a Binary Byzantine Consensus algorithm using S-Broadcast in addition to a strong (t + 1) common coin.
Message types. The following message types are used by the consensus.
• aux[r](s). An aux message contains a round number r and a binary value s.
• s i . The binary value returned by the most recent call to random() at process i.
• support coin i . A Boolean variable that indicates if the current estimate at processes i is equal to the value of the most recent coin flip.
• bin ptr i . A list of two pointers to Boolean variables returned by calls to S-Broadcast at process i, where bin ptr i [0] represents the pointer returned by a call to S broadcast(0, ) and bin ptr i [1] represents the pointer returned by a call to S broadcast(1, ).
Algorithm description. Figure 5 presents the algorithm. Before describing the algorithm line by line some key points are introduced. First note that, given lines 12-13, only the value of the coin can be decided in a round. Second, given line 04, only the negation of the coin from the previous round is S-Broadcast in all rounds following the first round. These two points help support the intuition of the design of the algorithm as follows (assume it is given that the output of the coin in a round r is s): (i) given that ¬s could not have been decided in round r, if s was a possible valid decision in round r then it remains so in round r + 1, so a process can immediately support s in round r + 1 and (ii) given that s could have been decided in round r, ¬s must be checked in round r + 1 to see if it is still a valid value to decide. Using this and various thresholds (including the t + 1 threshold of the coin) and broadcasts liveness and correctness is then ensured. The algorithm is now briefly described. Non-faulty processes call propose() with their initial proposal v. Line 01 initiates the local variables so that on lines 02-04 non-faulty processes call bin ptr [¬v] ← S broadcast est [1] (¬v, false) and bin ptr [v] ← S broadcast est [1] (v, true), (i.e. in round 1 they call the S-Broadcast abstraction for both 0 and 1, but with support coin = true only for their initial proposal). Given t < n/3 and S-Obligation at at least one of the bin ptr variables point to a Boolean variable that becomes true and by S-Justification was proposed by a non-faulty process in the first round. Lines 03-16 are repeated for each round. The round starts by incrementing the round variable (line 03. Non-faulty processes then make a call to S broadcast on line 04 with the negation of the coin from the previous round and the negation of the Boolean variable support coin set on the previous round as inputs. This ensures that the input should broadcast to S broadcast is only true if the process decided not to support the output coin from the previous round. Given that the coin could have been decided in the previous round, this call to the S-Broadcast abstraction is to check if the negation of the coin remains a possible value to decide in round r + 1. The bin ptr pointer to the Boolean variable corresponding to the coin is not changed as its state of being a value that can be decided remains the same as the previous round. Non-faulty processes then wait on line 05 until at least one of the bin ptr variables point to a true Boolean value. On lines 06-09 processes compute the value w that they broadcast in an aux[r]() message on line 10. This value w is either the value of the coin from the previous round if support coin = true or a binary value for which bin ptr [w] = true. The set view [r] is then computed on line 11 from the the values included with aux[r]() messages received from (n − t) distinct processes for which the corresponding bin ptr variables point to a true Boolean. The strong (t + 1) common coin is then computed on line 14. If view[r] contains a single value equal to the output of the coin then that value is decided on line 13 and support coin is set to true. Otherwise if view[r] = {0, 1}, support coin is set to true and no value is decided (line 14). Otherwise support coin is set to false and no value is decided (line 15). Given t < n/3, if a non-faulty process decided then any set of (n − t) aux[r]() messages contain at least one message supporting the coin, thus ensuring all non-faulty processes set support coin ← true. The round is then complete and the next round is started.
Proofs.
This section shows that the algorithm of Figure 5 solves Binary Byzantine consensus and terminates in an expected constant number of rounds.
Lemma 12. Non-faulty processes complete each round.
Proof. Each non-faulty process proposes an initial binary value v. By S-Termination all non-faulty processes will reach line 05 calling S-Broadcast with both 0 and 1 on lines 02,04. On line 03 each non-faulty process calls bin ptr [¬v] ← S broadcast est [1] (v, true) (note that here the variables are replaced to show that non-faulty processes are calling S-Broadcast with their proposal and true as input). Given that t < n/3 at least one of the S-broadcast instances will be called with should broadcast = true for a single binary value by at least t + 1 non-faulty processes, and by S-Obligation the condition on line 06 will be satisfied. It follows that either line 08 or line 09 (or both) be satisfied at all non-faulty processes and they will broadcast aux [1] (w) where bin ptr [w] = true. Now given S-Obligation all non-faulty processes will receive at least (n − t) aux [1] () messages with values w that satisfy bin ptr [w] = true. All non-faulty processes will then call random() and the value of the coin will be output. The case on lines 13-15 will then be completed and non-faulty processes will continue onto round 2.
Now consider by induction that all non-faulty processes have completed round r. Let the output of the coin in round r be binary value s. If a non-faulty process sets support coin = true in round r it must have had bin values[s] = true (lines 13, 14) , and given the pointer bin values[s] is not modified in round r + 1, bin values[s] = true at all non-faulty processes in round r + 1 by S-Obligation. Call this note property (a).
Consider the following two cases representing the values of support coin set in round r at nonfaulty processes:
• At least t + 1 non-faulty processes set support coin ← false in round r on line 15. Now given the strong property of the coin, these processes will then call bin ptr [¬s] ← S broadcastest[r+ 1](¬s, true) and by S-Obligation eventually bin ptr [¬s] = true at all non-faulty processes in round r + 1 and the wait condition on line 05 will be satisfied. From this and by (a) all non-faulty processes will broadcast messages aux[r + 1](v) where bin ptr [v] = true on line 10 which will ensure the wait on line 11 will be completed and all non-faulty processes will continue to round r + 2.
• Otherwise less than t + 1 non-faulty processes set supportcoin ← false in round r on line 15. In this case less than t + 1 non-faulty processes will call bin ptr [¬s] ← S broadcastest[r + 1](¬s, true) and by S-Justification bin ptr [¬s] = false in round r + 1. Furthermore given t < n/3 and by (a) bin values[s] = true at all non-faulty processes, all non-faulty processes will set w ← s on lines 06-08 and broadcast aux[r + 1](s) on line 10. The wait on line 10 will then be satisfied and all non-faulty processes will continue to round r + 2.
This completes the proof by induction. Proof. Let r be the first round where a non-faulty process decides and v be the binary value it decides. For this to happen the following must be true: bin ptr [v] = true by line 11 and s = v by line 13. Additionally, by the strong property of the coin, and by S-Obligation these will be true at all non-faulty processes. Furthermore, by line 11 a process that decides must have received (n − t) aux[r](v) messages from (n − t) distinct processes. Now given that t < n/3, any set of (n−t) aux[r]() messages from distinct processes must contain at least one aux[r](v) message. Thus by lines 13-14 all non-faulty processes will set support coin = true and no non-faulty process will decide ¬v in round r. Now in round r+1 all non-faulty processes will call bin ptr Otherwise the call random() returns ¬s in round r+1 and all non-faulty processes set support coin = false on line 15. In round r + 2 bin ptr [¬s] = false at all non-faulty processes given it is not changed from round r + 1. All non-faulty processes then call bin ptr [s] ← S broadcast est[r + 2](¬s, true) on line 04 and by S-Obligation bin ptr [s] = true at all non-faulty processes in round r + 2. Notice that the non-faulty processes are once again in state (a) except in round r + 2, the proof then follows. Proof. Consider a round r. Given the t + 1 property of the coin, at least t + 1 non-faulty processes have reached line 12 before the output of random() is revealed. Consider the following two cases when the t + 1th non-faulty process reaches this line:
• At least one of these non-faulty processes has computed view[r] ← {v} on line 11, i.e. view [r] contains a single binary value v. In this case if the output of the call to random() is v then the process will decide v on line 13 and decide in the next round where the output of the coin is v (if not done already) by Lemmas 13 and 17.
• Otherwise given t < n/3 all t + 1 of these non-faulty processes have set view [r] ← {0, 1} on line 11. Let the output of the the call to random() be s in round r. Note that the wait on line 11 and S-Uniformity ensure bin ptr [s] = true at all non-faulty processes in round r and given the pointer is not changed in round r + 1, this remains true in round r + 1. Now on line 14 the same t + 1 non-faulty processes set support coin ← true and in round r + 1 broadcast aux[r + 1](s). Given t < n/3 all sets of (n − t) distinct aux[r + 1]() messages will contain at least one aux[r + 1](s) message. It then follows that s ∈ view [r + 1] at all non-faulty processes. Now if the output of random() is s in round r + 1 then all non-faulty processes will set support coin i ← true on lines 13 or line 14 and by Lemma 17 all non-faulty processes will decide by the next round where the output of the call to random() is s.
In both cases in round r non-faulty processes reach a state where they will reach a decision with probability of at least 1/2 by the strong property of the coin, or decision is ensured with probability 1 − ∞ r=1 1/2 = 1. From this, the expected number of rounds to reach a state from which a decision is ensured is ∞ r=1 r 1 2 r = 2, and by Lemmas 17 and 13 all processes will decide by the next round where the coin flip results in the same value, i.e. another expected 2 rounds. Theorem 2. The algorithm presented in Figure 5 solves the Binary consensus problem in BAMP n,t [t < n/3, CC].
Proof. First recall the definition of Binary Byzantine Consensus.
BBC-Termination is ensured by Lemma 18. BBC-Agreement and BBC-Validity are ensured by Lemmas 14 and 16 respectively.
Message broadcasts. The S-Broadcast consists of at most 1 message broadcast. The first round of the consensus algorithm consists of 2 instances of S-Broadcast (where non-faulty processes perform a normal broadcast within at least one of these), followed by a normal message broadcast, or 2 to 3 message broadcasts. All following rounds consist of a call to S-Broadcast followed by a normal message broadcast, or 1 to 2 message broadcasts.
3.5 Optimization for the Safe and Live Consensus Algorithm in BAMP n,t [t < n/3, CC] from Figure 3 .
Notice that the strong (t + 1) common coin algorithm from Figure 5 uses the fact that a binary value may remain valid from the previous round in order to only perform a single S-Broadcast per round in rounds following the first round. A similar technique can be used to reduce the number of broadcasts used by the SBV-Abstractions of the algorithm in Figure 3 . Consider the binary value v (v¬⊥) from view[r, 2] which may be set to non-faulty processes' estimates on lines 12-13. By Lemma 6 and SBV-Binvalues this can only be a single binary value and if such a value exists then all non-faulty processes have it in their bin values returned from the call to SBV broadcast stage[r, 1]. With this, non-faulty processes can skip the initial broadcast of the value in the following round and broadcast it directly within an aux message in SBV broadcast stage[r + 1, 0], where the bin values returned by SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] ensures its validity. Furthermore notice that this does not affect termination as this binary value is only used in the termination proof when it is equal to the value output by the coin at all non-faulty processes, in which case all non-faulty processes take this value as the estimate regardless. This optimization then can be further applied to ⊥ when input to the SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] on line 10. Here processes can immediately broadcast ⊥ in the aux message, using the fact that all non-faulty processes will bin values[r] = {0, 1} (the bin values returned by SBV broadcast stage[r, 0]) as support. Again termination is not effected using a similar argument as before.
This optimization reduces the number of message broadcast performed by the SBV-Broadcast abstraction from between 2 and 3 to between 1 and 2. Notice that if SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] only uses a single broadcast, then SBV broadcast stage[r, 2] will use 2 broadcasts, as the single broadcast of SBV broadcast stage[r, 2] can only be used for ⊥ which requires SBV broadcast stage[r, 1] to use 2 broadcasts. Thus the number of message broadcasts performed per round becomes 4 to 5.
Note that a similar opimization could be applied to the algorithm of [12] that uses a similar construction but relies on a synchrony assumption for termination.
